Professor Susan Shirk
Interview with Susan Shirk, Ho Miu Lam Professor of China and Pacific Relations at UCSD
Conducted by Isaac Gray, Benjamin Sachrison, Daniel Leibowitz, and Connor Smith with the help of Ms. Mary Ong-Dean
Length: 58:02
Date: 21 December 2013
Daniel: During your time involved with relations with East Asian countries, how much of that time did you spend interacting with North Korea? Or either one of the Koreas?
Shirk: Well, maybe it will help if I just tell the story of how I got involved with North Korea in the first place. Because, I’m a China scholar, but back in 1993, I founded what’s called the Track 2 Dialogue for Northeast Asia, meaning that it’s not official, but government officials come in a private capacity. Along with academics from Russia, China, Japan, the US, North Korea, and South Korea. So, the idea was that there is no regional organization in that area of the world, and there are still risks of military conflict, a lot of mistrust. So, actually at the time our focus was actually to try and engage China, this is in 1992-1993. Before the first meeting, I went to all the capitals to try and get the foreign ministries and the defense ministries to send their people. And that was my first trip to North Korea in 1993. And since that time I’ve been back there four more times, so five in total.
Daniel: And, you’ve taken trips to North Korea, but not South Korea?
(5:00)
Shirk: No, I do go to South Korea. I go to South Korea more frequently than that.
Ong-Dean: So, maybe it will be helpful for the students if you could let us know a little bit about what North Korea’s like from your first-hand experiences. What do you see when you’re there?
Shirk: Well, North Korea is a very poor, internationally isolated country. Pyongyang, which is the capital, is really the best part of the country. And the gap in the living standards between Pyongyang and the rest of the country is very dramatic. I always ask to go some place out of Pyongyang to see what it’s like out there, but I haven’t been very far away. I’ve been to provincial capitals. Pyongyang has some very tall buildings, I have some books, some photographic books, that you could look And, consumer goods are in very scarce supply. In fact, nowadays when I go from Beijing to Pyongyang, the gap is so huge. It’s very similar to the gap I saw when traveling between Hong Kong and China in 1971; the gap was huge.
Daniel: And did they do that thing where, since you’re arriving from a foreign organization, they assign someone who sort of monitors you?
Shirk: Yeah, you’re not there by yourself. You know, you have a host, and that host follows you around pretty much everywhere. I mean, sometimes on some of my trips to North Korea I take a couple other people with me. And, some of them will go jogging in the morning. And they’ll go and accompany him while he runs. But ager a few cold, early mornings they kind of just forgot it and let him go by himself. But basically, they’re accompanying you almost all of the time, which is kind of what it was like in China in 1971.
Connor: So, when you went to North Korea with Track 2--
Shirk: Well, I was trying to get them to come to our Track 2 meeting and--
Connor: Were you ever successful?
Shirk: Yeah, they come up.
Ong-Dean: So do you feel like there is more of a willingness on North Korea’s side to participate in international relations than we hear about in the news?
Shirk: There is a little bit, a little bit. And, because I’ve been working at this for a very long time, and have built up a certain amount of trust, I think they felt it was a safe sort of way for them to learn more about what other countries are doing, and to present their case. You know, to present their point of view. Well they came in 1993, then we had the nuclear crisis over the agreed framework—I strongly urge you to research the history of this relationship between the US and North Korea. And then the North Koreans pulled out of the Track 2 meetings. So they did not come to our Track 2 meetings from 1994 to 2002. And then in 2002, I went back to North Korea, and it was a period when there was a somewhat of a loosening up. And Kim Jong Il at the time, I think, was definitely flirting with some market reforms, which ended up failing. But at that time, they decided to come back to the NEACD—that’s the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue—meetings.
Ben: To what degree did Chinese communism influence the Juche philosophy in North Korea? And how could North Korea possibly be different today if that influence had not been as strong?
(10:00)
Shirk: Well how do you think of Juche?
Ben: Juche…speaks of self-reliance and independence, and that’s also why we see so much with North Korea, at least in our opinion, that they’re so unwilling to accept aid. Or at least show that they’re willing to accept aid. Correct?
Shirk: Well, you got part of that right. The translation of Juche would be self-reliance. And that concept was strong in Mao-era China as well. I think the scholars of different varieties of communist ideologies in these countries might see that there are some differences. I don’t really see the fine points. But Juche does mean self-reliance. By the way, North Korea wants aid. It doesn't reject aid at all. And that’s a contradiction isn’t it. I mean you’d think that if they really cared about self-reliance they’d want to change their economic system so it works better. But there are a lot of vested interests in this whole, highly unstable economic system. And there’s a lot of resistance to market reform. They also seem to believe that if you introduce more competition in your economy, and more profit incentives, and this kind of thing; that it would somehow be a slippery slope that would eventually lead to political change. And yet we see examples from China and Vietnam of countries that were able to introduce market reforms and maintain a communist political system.
Ong-Dean: So, what were some of the market reforms that Kim Jong Il was flirting with in the early 2000s and why did they fail?
Shirk: Well that’s actually a harder question to answer than you might think. Because, they didn’t talk about reform, it was still kind of a dirty word in North Korean politics. But they were considering a kind of concept of more competition allowing factories or farms, after they’d met their plan quota, to dispose of the excess product they had through barter. Almost like a separate market. It was really hard to tell, but the concepts were changing. You know, one slogan I heard then was “Combat soviet-style equalism.” You know in other words, if people are going to get paid more for doing more, that would be okay. They did some currency reform, they re-valued their currency. It led to massive inflation. It was very poorly designed, and they didn't have a lot of good economists I don’t think. So the whole design of the reforms—which never got that far—. You know, Kim-Jong Il took four or five trips to China. And he would take his generals and other people with him. They went to the Shanghai stock market, and he explained to his generals how a stock market works. Now I don’t think you’re going to do that unless you have some thoughts of trying to introduce something similar in North Korea. But there are a lot of debate experts about this. Some people think “no, never”. Because I was there, and because I heard people saying this directly to me, and because I know people who were accompanying Kim-Jong Il on his trips to China and actually heard him telling his generals how the Shanghai stock market works, it just doesn't make any sense that somebody would do that unless they had some idea of trying to change their own economic system.
(15:00)
Ong-Dean: So then what do you think changed his mind?
Shirk: Well I think that the inflation was a disaster, and I think that the economy was a mess and that was destabilized by these things. And there’s been strong resistance, especially from the military, and heavy industry. And Kim-Jong Il’s power base was the military.
Daniel: So, since you’ve had so many dealings with North Korea and China, are there any really strong comparisons between the two countries that you could see where there was a lot of Chinese ideological influence in North Korea? Or is it very different between the two countries?
Shirk: Well, remember, North Korea actually had more dealings with the Soviet Union than they did with China. But China, and North Korea, and Vietnam, and Cuba; they all got their basic political system and structure of their political system—and to a certain extent their ideology of Marxism-Leninism—from the Soviet Union. And then you get different variations and evolutions that had to do with fighting the Korean War, the nature of the dictatorship—Kim-Il Sung compared to Mao compared to Stalin—. This is actually really interesting to see, because they all come from the sort of mothership here, and then they all evolve in different ways.
Connor: It’s obvious that culture and political systems weren't the only exports from the Soviet Union, you kind of touched on this but food aid was definitely one of things that came in great quantities in the mid-70s. I’ve read a lot of speeches from Kim-Il Sung where, like you said, he accepted it, quite willingly. And my question is--
Shirk: Before, can I just clarify something? North Korea, up until the 70s, was a rich, successful, industrial country; it was more advanced than South Korea. And then what happened was the Soviet Union basically fell and cut them off. China pretty much cut them off to the extent that they started expecting market prices for the commodities. So, there was the shock to the North Korean economy, which explains the downward spiral in the power of their economy.
Daniel: And that’s why they’ve ended up with blackouts, and food shortages and--
Shirk: Yeah, and it’s a really dire situation.
Connor: Well do you think that the seeds of the downfall were already there before China and the Soviet Union quit giving aid? Because, mismanagement in the 90s was also a problem.
Shirk: 90s? 90s is after.
Connor: Well sure, because that’s when the Soviet Union fell, right?
Shirk: Yeah but actually, North Korea I believe cut them off much earlier.
Connor: Okay.
Shirk: Because—well I should know this better than I do, you need to check on this, but—I think that the Soviet Union, even before it fell, was kind of digesting. But, I should know the history better than I do, I don’t remember. But of course, the economic system there, just like the Chinese economic system, was not very successful until they introduced market prices, and competition. (20:00) Because, until 1979 when they introduced reforms, they had growth rates that were respectable. But, per capita income was just stagnant for decades. And North Korea, I think had probably a lot of the same characteristics—. Although, China was more agricultural, North Korea was always the more industrial part of the peninsula. The South was the more agricultural part.
Connor: So…when you talked about the inflation problems there in the early 2000s, what has the government done since then—I know you touched on how the military and heavy industry were against the reforms. And since the rampant inflation to the currency revaluation they really had no choice but to change their economic path. Do you know anything more about what happened after 2002?
Shirk: Yeah, I mean the reforms failed. There was a political backlash from his powerful interest groups, and by 2005 they had a very clear military-first policy. Where the focus is on heavy industry. Its even more Stalinist than they’d been previously. So it just goes back to trying to restore central planning, and a focus on military industry. But, in 2011, March of 2011, I brought the first group of North Korean economic officials here. And we haven’t had a second group. I invited them but they haven’t come. It is clear that there’s a kind of—that the planning system, really hasn’t worked very well. So, although they say we’re a planned economy, there’s a lot of stuff going on on the ground. And there are two reasons why you do have some market activity on the ground. One is: people are desperate. The planned food distribution—now you see, they never had this in China. In China you had ration tickets. But people could always get some food from private plots and things like that. But in North Korea, you’re supposed to depend entirely on the planned food distribution.
Daniel: And that makes you rely heavily on the government so they have more control.
Shirk: Exactly. Yes, but also, if you have very little, it’s probably the most equitable way to distribute it. But the point is, the amount that you get is below survival rates. It’s not enough.
Connor: Yeah when you look at it, it’s like 1200 calories. It’s terrible, yeah.
Shirk: Therefore, people have to go out there and scrounge in—. You know, they eat all sorts of things that should not be eaten. And people who produce a little bit of their own food, or some people might mix up some cookies or something like that, and then they’ll go and sell them. So there’s market activity.
The other reason there’s some market activity--
Daniel: And does that market have to be black market, or undercover?
Shirk: Kind of, it’s tolerated by them. It depends upon the annual harvest cycle. So, after the harvest when food is more plentiful, they tend to crack down more on market activity. Then when you get toward the end of the year and there’s no food, they loosen up because they have to.
Ong-Dean: Because that helps bring food into the market.
Shirk: It means that it might help people survive. But still, there’s tremendous malnutrition. Very serious malnutrition. And I’ve send the stunting there. Adolescents or 20-year-old people are smaller—they’re stunting. And stunting goes along with cognitive problems too.
(25:00)
Ong-Dean: So, because this is a history project the boys are trying to figure out what the historical foundations of the current condition in North Korea is. They’re trying to tease out what was the role of Soviet-inspired communism, and the philosophy of Juche; and then what is the role of Soviet and Chinese aid in—. And then, different economic philosophies that created the current system. Or was it purely a matter of personality of the leaders?
Shirk: I think it’s more systemic than historical. I’m not a North Korea expert actually. So, the failures of the system, I mean the economic failures, have to do with the shock from the loss of support from the Soviet Union and China. And, the inherent problems of a centrally planned communist economy. And third, the fact that North Korea’s policy behavior has isolated it from the rest of the word. So, now it faces extensive sanctions. So I’d say it’s all those three things.
Connor: Do you think that the global community, and especially the West now that North Korea’s allies in the Eastern bloc have fallen— Does the global community have a responsibility to provide food aid to North Korea? Or are the sanctions that you’ve talked about—are they more important?
Shirk: Now this is really a very difficult question to answer. American policy has constantly been that food aid should be separate from negotiations over nuclear issues. The food aid is a humanitarian matter. But that’s a little disingenuous, because troches of food aid do come when there’s progress in the negotiations. And now the policy is definitely to keep the pressure on North Korea. Because, efforts to negotiate in a positive way through different kinds of inducements—America and most of the international community feels have been unsuccessful. And, the focus is on the nuclear issue. And the nuclear threat. You could argue that we’re making a mistake by fixating on nuclear weapons. You know you could argue that what really matters is whether or not they actually use those nuclear weapons, and what their intentions are, and that we should try to draw them out—. Not use normalization of relations as a carrot that we never award them. It’s really a very interesting set of issues to debate. And then many people would say that, look; yeah we do have a responsibility. We don’t want the people of North Korea to starve. But by the way, there are plenty of other countries in Africa where people are just as bad off. And why not give them aid, rather than the folks in North Korea? (30:00) My own feeling is that food aid should be done as a humanitarian matter in North Korea. But I also support the idea of trying to encourage North Korea to not just take food, but to take trucks or tractors or chemical fertilizer. It will help them grow more of their own food.
Connor: Do you think that the food ever gets to the people? Or is it diverted to military or government officials in the bureaucracy?
Isaac: Yeah, there’s been figures where a large percentage of that food goes to the military and government first, and then has to sort of trickle down to the general population.
Shirk: You know, we have insisted, and the UN food program has insisted, on a lot of monitoring. But, it’s real hard to know. I mean, I don’t believe that none of it gets to ordinary people. I don’t believe that it’s all claimed by them. Because, by the way, the elite in North Korea—the political and military elite…they are fairly comfortable and well-to-do because of all sorts of corrupt earnings. And we haven’t even talked about China and North Korea trade. Which is the other reason that we have market activity there. Because China comes and sells consumer goods and things like that. Chinese traders coming over the border. And North Korea pays for those things in minerals. Because it’s a very rich country in terms of mineral wealth.
Daniel: And is that trade between North Korea and China sort of set up between the two political bodies, or is it just undercover—?
Shirk: Well most of it is non-governmental. Although there are purchases by the government of grain, and oil, and things like that. But in terms of a lot of it is just border trade.
Ong-Dean: And that’s…is that--
Daniel: Tolerated?
Shirk: Yes, it is tolerated. I mean, I met a guy last time I was there—which is fall of 2011—and he had a piano from China. So his kid could have piano lessons. So you know, the elite lives in a much more comfortable lifestyle.
Ong-Dean: But, that kind of trade isn’t available to ordinary people?
Shirk: Well, it’s a question of money.
Connor: You talked about how, through the failed economic reforms that Kim-Jong Il tried, the countries kind of returned to a military-first strategy. It kind of harkens back to the country’s “glory days” in the 50s and 60s and earlier in the country’s founding. Do you think this is the right way to go? Do you think the country should try more economic reforms?
Shirk: Oh absolutely. And also, if—. That’s why I brought North Korean economic officials here. That’s why it’s been—. It’s been kind of a personal goal of mine to try and encourage market reform in North Korea. Because I studied market reform in China, I read a book called the logic of economic reform in China. So the first time I went to North Korea in 1993 I took my book with me. And tried to tell people like a missionary. You know, if you—. It doesn’t have to be political suicide. You could do this and it would work.
Ong-Dean: Do you think the government in North Korea has an incentive to try?
Shirk: Well, it’s really risky. But, on the other hand, what they’re doing now is also very risky. And…it’s just plain evil.
(35:00)
I did not agree with the Bush administration approach, which was actually not that different to the approach today of pretty much freezing relations with North Korea and putting pressure on them. And remember George W. Bush talked about the axis of evil and “I loather Kim-Jong Il”… Anyway. But you can understand why somebody would get that emotional about it because it’s just reprehensible. Have you read the book by Barbara…Demick? Nothing to Envy? Isn’t that an amazing book?
Did you also read Orphan Master’s Son? The novel?
Isaac: No, but I’ve heard recommendations for it.
Shirk: Well it’s a—it won the Pulitzer Prize for fiction last year. And actually it’s by Adam Johnson. Adam Johnson, I think he maybe went on one tour group to North Korea. But he did extensive research. And there’s no way to know how true it is. But it’s a tremendous kind of act of imagination about what it must be like to be in North Korea. I really recommend it. And Adam Johnson is coming to speak at UCSD about his book on January 30th.
So, what I’m saying is you should all read the book. I mean it’s just a great novel. What year are you all?
Daniel: Sophomores. So what’s the title of the book again?
Shirk: Orphan Master’s Son. Oddly—I mean of course it’s disturbing and it’s depressing, but it’s also funny and it’s just a great read.
Connor: Well, back to the economics in North Korea…China had a very committed reformer in Deng Xiaoping. What tools do you think North Korea needs in order to move towards a market economy?
Shirk: Well, especially under Kim-Jong Il—he built up the military as the main power base. The communist party itself is pretty weak. I mean it’s a dictator and an army, it’s a party, and there is a government—the cabinet and the government. But of all those different parts, the military was the strongest. In China, it was the party. So what in China Deng Xiaoping was able to do was to design the reform so the different officials and groups within the party gradually would buy into it and they would see advantages to themselves to engaging in market activity. By letting certain factories, certain firms or localities be experiments to first go and have a lower plan quota and then go and sell to the market and then people would make more money because the prices in the market would be more—. It’s a shortage economy that’s what—. And, you can make more, you can keep more, and before long people are clamoring and groups are clamoring “we want more of this!” So it’s a really successful strategy.
Now you could do the same thing in North Korea…with the military. So, I think it’s possible, but they haven’t done it.
Connor: Do you think there’s someone outside the country who can? I mean do you think if there are--
Shirk: Outside of the country?
Connor: Sure. So, like, your organization is trying to normalize relations with North Korea. Do you think that if the country becomes more respectful of international diplomats or economists…that that could be the direction for North Korea to build their economy?
(40:00)
Shirk: I think the—. I mean again I look at the Chinese case. In the 70s, Deng Xiaoping and other officials started traveling abroad. They saw this huge gap between living standards in China and in other countries, and that was a very important motivator in getting them to introduce market reform.
So, I think we should try and get North Koreans out of North Korea. I mean, just to look and see what it’s like in other places in the world. I am very much in favor of that.
Daniel: Because right now they don’t really know any different.
Shirk: Yeah, and of course, people have no exposure to ideas—. I mean it’s a more closed system than I’d say China was.
Daniel: And talking about that closed system, how much do you think the government there uses that Juche philosophy to sort of instigate the closed system?
Shirk: I think that’s the foundation, the ideological foundation. And a lot in North Korea is because of the competition with South Korea, and the contrast with South Korea. So they claim that they’re the true Koreans; it’s kind of like Juche has a nationalist strain to it. So they say that South Korea has become polluted with all these Western ideas and they’re just the tools of the Americans.
Daniel: Because it’s the North Korean view that they need to be very pure.
Shirk: You need to be a sort of “pure” Korean.
Connor: And the only pure Koreans are North Koreans in their eyes.
Shirk: There’s actually a book written from this angle. Did you read that book…
Connor: I think I know what you’re going to say but go ahead and say it.
Shirk: There’s a book written about these kind of purity—.
Connor: Yeah, the author was a little—. He was the first guy who kind of brought up how Juche is a very nationalistic and also a racial ideology. It’s not Michael Seth it was…it’s on our list; it’s on our reading list.
Daniel: We’ve been talking about the economic sanctions and the effects they’ve had on North Korea. Sort of going back a couple of years, before the 2000s, how do you think that economic sanctions in the past during the time of the Arduous March—during those huge food shortages—. How much do you think that they affected sort of the “common” Korean person?
Ong-Dean: And then also, strengthening that national isolation that’s so characteristic of North Korea today.
Shirk: Well I don’t really know the answer to that specific question about sanctions during that period.
Connor: But do sanctions hurt the people?
Shirk: No I’m not—my knowledge is not that specific. Sanctions—do sanctions hurt people? —I mean, they contribute to the whole backwardness. They can’t repair…they have all these old power plants and things. They can’t get parts to repair it. They have a rusting, decaying industrial plant. Chemical fertilizer is a major need in North Korea.
(45:00)
Ong-Dean: So, you implied that our current policy—the George Bush policy which is not too different from our current policy of isolating North Korea—is not the approach that you would advocate.
Shirk: No, I advocate pressure. But I believe that food aid should be on a separate humanitarian track. I also believe that we need to keep trying to negotiate and to try and get North Koreans out of North Korea…to see things. But I believe that a certain amount of pressure is necessary.
Ong-Dean: Do you think that the current relationship and North Korea doesn’t allow for that open dialogue and negotiation to occur?
Shirk: It’s pretty hard over—. What we’ve basically said is that we need to see action on the nuclear front. That they should unilaterally close things down, invite the inspectors back in, do something that shows they’re serious. Because we don’t want to be suckered again.
Ong-Dean: And you feel like we should move from that position—?
Shirk: I feel that this is a kind of dead end. We’re not going to bring the regime down through sanctions. And, they’re continuing to build up. And it’s a very dangerous regime. We don’t know when they might again make an unprovoked use of force against South Korea. So I guess I believe that we should maybe take a few risks of being frustrated and humiliated again, because you never know when something good might happen. Now, on the other hand, let’s remember, Kim-Jong Un just executed his uncle. I mean, it’s appearing to be a more brutal totalitarian stage of North Korean communism than maybe we’ve ever seen before. You know we would hope that Kim-Jong Un, who has spent time abroad, might take a new approach. But, you know what’s interesting is that these sons—we always have the hope in the sons like Assad in Syria and stuff like that. And, rarely do we see—Gaddafi's son did actually I believe initiated some of the changes in Libya. But typically, we’re disappointed.
Isaac: I read something that said North Koreans consider the tiger father, which is Kim-Jong Il, and then the dog son, which would be Kim-Jong Un, and then they have this execution, which makes them think of him as more of a tiger figure.
Shirk: A strong leader.
Connor: This is just a silly short question, but when you went to North Korea, did you ever get to meet with some families there? I mean you probably didn’t meet with any “normal” or rural families, but outside of your minders, did you get to see any urban families in Pyongyang?
Shirk: Well, I didn’t go to homes. So I haven’t been to anyone’s home.
Connor: They’re obviously pretty secretive about that.
Shirk: You’re supposed to pull your blinds down even. I mean, you know, they didn’t have bicycles in North Korea because of controlling people’s mobility. So, when I first went to North Korea—now there are a few more cars and buses and stuff, but when I first went to North Korea, I would see hundreds of people just walking on these wide boulevards because it wasn’t like China where everybody had bicycles.
Daniel: It’s almost as if they’ve been sent back in time a little bit.
Shirk: Yeah it’s pretty spooky.
(50:00)
Daniel: Do you think that the philosophy of Juche—not sort of its core values, but the way it’s being used by the government in North Korea in sort of controlling people…do you think that the philosophy subverts the social contract?
Shirk: The social contract between ruler and citizen?
Ong-Dean: Yeah, but do you think that that’s even a question you can apply to North Korea?
Daniel: Like even if there is a social contract there?
Ong-Dean: Is there? Do you think that the government and its people would even consider that there’s a social contract between the government and its people.
Shirk: Well, of course the government depicts itself to the people as having their best interests at heart. But, they’re leading their people off a cliff. I mean, it’s—. And meanwhile, the people at the top are living very well.
Ong-Dean: But do you think that the average citizen in North Korea—and I know that you haven’t spoken to many of these, but is your impression that the average North Korean would consider the government as having their best interests in mind?
Shirk: Well I mean if you read Nothing to Envy, you see that people don’t even really let themselves think critical thoughts, especially about the government. That’s what they have to live with.
Ong-Dean: Well, so our question is that this philosophy of self-reliance is something that citizens can hang on to as something that they’re doing—as a kind of patriotism right. So this is our role in the nation; to be self reliant, to weather the storms like famine, and—.
Shirk: Yeah, we’re all together and we stand together and yeah I think people have been educated from a very young age that the risks of critical thinking are huge. Because it’s so repressive. And I think that probably very few people dare to question. And you’re right about the tougher things are, the more dependent people are on the government. So, this is why I think, in the United States, people have exaggerated the ability of the outside world to destabilize and bring down the regime. We’ve underestimated the staying power of this very bad regime. Very bad governments can last for a very long time.
Ong-Dean: And what you’re saying—it’s so funny—is that the harder that we make things on the Korean people, the more reliant they are on their government.
Shirk: Yeah, how are we doing time wise?
Ong-Dean: I think it depends on how much time you have.
Shirk: Yeah, I think let’s do the last question.
Ong-Dean: So, I think that if you just ask about if there’s anything else that Professor Shirk thinks you need to know for your project and if there’s any other information you can give them about people—you’ve already given them some books to read and a talk to go here. If there’s anything else you think they should do—.
Shirk: Yeah, I think they should look at the economic relationship between China and North Korea. And the mythology—are you going to interview Stephen Haggard? (55:00) Well before you go interview him—I gave you his name right? You need to read the book we wrote with Marcus Noland.
Daniel: I think I have it, from the library.
Shirk: It’s the same name as their blog. And that blog is just filled with good information.
Ben: Yeah there’s definitely a lot in there.
Shirk: And they’re also trying to figure out what it means that Kim-Jong Un killed his uncle. Does it mean that they’re really weak now, or…? It just tells you how opaque and how hard it is to form judgments because we have so little information and we don’t have—I mean we have theories, but it’s really hard to know which theories to apply.
Daniel: And then just a last thing, do you have any other people you think would be good for us to interview?
Shirk: I don’t think in town there are other people—I mean Stephen Haggard is the person who is most knowledgeable about North Korea here for sure. I’m very interested in North Korea, but it’s not really my scholarly area.
(Interview ends)
Conducted by Isaac Gray, Benjamin Sachrison, Daniel Leibowitz, and Connor Smith with the help of Ms. Mary Ong-Dean
Length: 58:02
Date: 21 December 2013
Daniel: During your time involved with relations with East Asian countries, how much of that time did you spend interacting with North Korea? Or either one of the Koreas?
Shirk: Well, maybe it will help if I just tell the story of how I got involved with North Korea in the first place. Because, I’m a China scholar, but back in 1993, I founded what’s called the Track 2 Dialogue for Northeast Asia, meaning that it’s not official, but government officials come in a private capacity. Along with academics from Russia, China, Japan, the US, North Korea, and South Korea. So, the idea was that there is no regional organization in that area of the world, and there are still risks of military conflict, a lot of mistrust. So, actually at the time our focus was actually to try and engage China, this is in 1992-1993. Before the first meeting, I went to all the capitals to try and get the foreign ministries and the defense ministries to send their people. And that was my first trip to North Korea in 1993. And since that time I’ve been back there four more times, so five in total.
Daniel: And, you’ve taken trips to North Korea, but not South Korea?
(5:00)
Shirk: No, I do go to South Korea. I go to South Korea more frequently than that.
Ong-Dean: So, maybe it will be helpful for the students if you could let us know a little bit about what North Korea’s like from your first-hand experiences. What do you see when you’re there?
Shirk: Well, North Korea is a very poor, internationally isolated country. Pyongyang, which is the capital, is really the best part of the country. And the gap in the living standards between Pyongyang and the rest of the country is very dramatic. I always ask to go some place out of Pyongyang to see what it’s like out there, but I haven’t been very far away. I’ve been to provincial capitals. Pyongyang has some very tall buildings, I have some books, some photographic books, that you could look And, consumer goods are in very scarce supply. In fact, nowadays when I go from Beijing to Pyongyang, the gap is so huge. It’s very similar to the gap I saw when traveling between Hong Kong and China in 1971; the gap was huge.
Daniel: And did they do that thing where, since you’re arriving from a foreign organization, they assign someone who sort of monitors you?
Shirk: Yeah, you’re not there by yourself. You know, you have a host, and that host follows you around pretty much everywhere. I mean, sometimes on some of my trips to North Korea I take a couple other people with me. And, some of them will go jogging in the morning. And they’ll go and accompany him while he runs. But ager a few cold, early mornings they kind of just forgot it and let him go by himself. But basically, they’re accompanying you almost all of the time, which is kind of what it was like in China in 1971.
Connor: So, when you went to North Korea with Track 2--
Shirk: Well, I was trying to get them to come to our Track 2 meeting and--
Connor: Were you ever successful?
Shirk: Yeah, they come up.
Ong-Dean: So do you feel like there is more of a willingness on North Korea’s side to participate in international relations than we hear about in the news?
Shirk: There is a little bit, a little bit. And, because I’ve been working at this for a very long time, and have built up a certain amount of trust, I think they felt it was a safe sort of way for them to learn more about what other countries are doing, and to present their case. You know, to present their point of view. Well they came in 1993, then we had the nuclear crisis over the agreed framework—I strongly urge you to research the history of this relationship between the US and North Korea. And then the North Koreans pulled out of the Track 2 meetings. So they did not come to our Track 2 meetings from 1994 to 2002. And then in 2002, I went back to North Korea, and it was a period when there was a somewhat of a loosening up. And Kim Jong Il at the time, I think, was definitely flirting with some market reforms, which ended up failing. But at that time, they decided to come back to the NEACD—that’s the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue—meetings.
Ben: To what degree did Chinese communism influence the Juche philosophy in North Korea? And how could North Korea possibly be different today if that influence had not been as strong?
(10:00)
Shirk: Well how do you think of Juche?
Ben: Juche…speaks of self-reliance and independence, and that’s also why we see so much with North Korea, at least in our opinion, that they’re so unwilling to accept aid. Or at least show that they’re willing to accept aid. Correct?
Shirk: Well, you got part of that right. The translation of Juche would be self-reliance. And that concept was strong in Mao-era China as well. I think the scholars of different varieties of communist ideologies in these countries might see that there are some differences. I don’t really see the fine points. But Juche does mean self-reliance. By the way, North Korea wants aid. It doesn't reject aid at all. And that’s a contradiction isn’t it. I mean you’d think that if they really cared about self-reliance they’d want to change their economic system so it works better. But there are a lot of vested interests in this whole, highly unstable economic system. And there’s a lot of resistance to market reform. They also seem to believe that if you introduce more competition in your economy, and more profit incentives, and this kind of thing; that it would somehow be a slippery slope that would eventually lead to political change. And yet we see examples from China and Vietnam of countries that were able to introduce market reforms and maintain a communist political system.
Ong-Dean: So, what were some of the market reforms that Kim Jong Il was flirting with in the early 2000s and why did they fail?
Shirk: Well that’s actually a harder question to answer than you might think. Because, they didn’t talk about reform, it was still kind of a dirty word in North Korean politics. But they were considering a kind of concept of more competition allowing factories or farms, after they’d met their plan quota, to dispose of the excess product they had through barter. Almost like a separate market. It was really hard to tell, but the concepts were changing. You know, one slogan I heard then was “Combat soviet-style equalism.” You know in other words, if people are going to get paid more for doing more, that would be okay. They did some currency reform, they re-valued their currency. It led to massive inflation. It was very poorly designed, and they didn't have a lot of good economists I don’t think. So the whole design of the reforms—which never got that far—. You know, Kim-Jong Il took four or five trips to China. And he would take his generals and other people with him. They went to the Shanghai stock market, and he explained to his generals how a stock market works. Now I don’t think you’re going to do that unless you have some thoughts of trying to introduce something similar in North Korea. But there are a lot of debate experts about this. Some people think “no, never”. Because I was there, and because I heard people saying this directly to me, and because I know people who were accompanying Kim-Jong Il on his trips to China and actually heard him telling his generals how the Shanghai stock market works, it just doesn't make any sense that somebody would do that unless they had some idea of trying to change their own economic system.
(15:00)
Ong-Dean: So then what do you think changed his mind?
Shirk: Well I think that the inflation was a disaster, and I think that the economy was a mess and that was destabilized by these things. And there’s been strong resistance, especially from the military, and heavy industry. And Kim-Jong Il’s power base was the military.
Daniel: So, since you’ve had so many dealings with North Korea and China, are there any really strong comparisons between the two countries that you could see where there was a lot of Chinese ideological influence in North Korea? Or is it very different between the two countries?
Shirk: Well, remember, North Korea actually had more dealings with the Soviet Union than they did with China. But China, and North Korea, and Vietnam, and Cuba; they all got their basic political system and structure of their political system—and to a certain extent their ideology of Marxism-Leninism—from the Soviet Union. And then you get different variations and evolutions that had to do with fighting the Korean War, the nature of the dictatorship—Kim-Il Sung compared to Mao compared to Stalin—. This is actually really interesting to see, because they all come from the sort of mothership here, and then they all evolve in different ways.
Connor: It’s obvious that culture and political systems weren't the only exports from the Soviet Union, you kind of touched on this but food aid was definitely one of things that came in great quantities in the mid-70s. I’ve read a lot of speeches from Kim-Il Sung where, like you said, he accepted it, quite willingly. And my question is--
Shirk: Before, can I just clarify something? North Korea, up until the 70s, was a rich, successful, industrial country; it was more advanced than South Korea. And then what happened was the Soviet Union basically fell and cut them off. China pretty much cut them off to the extent that they started expecting market prices for the commodities. So, there was the shock to the North Korean economy, which explains the downward spiral in the power of their economy.
Daniel: And that’s why they’ve ended up with blackouts, and food shortages and--
Shirk: Yeah, and it’s a really dire situation.
Connor: Well do you think that the seeds of the downfall were already there before China and the Soviet Union quit giving aid? Because, mismanagement in the 90s was also a problem.
Shirk: 90s? 90s is after.
Connor: Well sure, because that’s when the Soviet Union fell, right?
Shirk: Yeah but actually, North Korea I believe cut them off much earlier.
Connor: Okay.
Shirk: Because—well I should know this better than I do, you need to check on this, but—I think that the Soviet Union, even before it fell, was kind of digesting. But, I should know the history better than I do, I don’t remember. But of course, the economic system there, just like the Chinese economic system, was not very successful until they introduced market prices, and competition. (20:00) Because, until 1979 when they introduced reforms, they had growth rates that were respectable. But, per capita income was just stagnant for decades. And North Korea, I think had probably a lot of the same characteristics—. Although, China was more agricultural, North Korea was always the more industrial part of the peninsula. The South was the more agricultural part.
Connor: So…when you talked about the inflation problems there in the early 2000s, what has the government done since then—I know you touched on how the military and heavy industry were against the reforms. And since the rampant inflation to the currency revaluation they really had no choice but to change their economic path. Do you know anything more about what happened after 2002?
Shirk: Yeah, I mean the reforms failed. There was a political backlash from his powerful interest groups, and by 2005 they had a very clear military-first policy. Where the focus is on heavy industry. Its even more Stalinist than they’d been previously. So it just goes back to trying to restore central planning, and a focus on military industry. But, in 2011, March of 2011, I brought the first group of North Korean economic officials here. And we haven’t had a second group. I invited them but they haven’t come. It is clear that there’s a kind of—that the planning system, really hasn’t worked very well. So, although they say we’re a planned economy, there’s a lot of stuff going on on the ground. And there are two reasons why you do have some market activity on the ground. One is: people are desperate. The planned food distribution—now you see, they never had this in China. In China you had ration tickets. But people could always get some food from private plots and things like that. But in North Korea, you’re supposed to depend entirely on the planned food distribution.
Daniel: And that makes you rely heavily on the government so they have more control.
Shirk: Exactly. Yes, but also, if you have very little, it’s probably the most equitable way to distribute it. But the point is, the amount that you get is below survival rates. It’s not enough.
Connor: Yeah when you look at it, it’s like 1200 calories. It’s terrible, yeah.
Shirk: Therefore, people have to go out there and scrounge in—. You know, they eat all sorts of things that should not be eaten. And people who produce a little bit of their own food, or some people might mix up some cookies or something like that, and then they’ll go and sell them. So there’s market activity.
The other reason there’s some market activity--
Daniel: And does that market have to be black market, or undercover?
Shirk: Kind of, it’s tolerated by them. It depends upon the annual harvest cycle. So, after the harvest when food is more plentiful, they tend to crack down more on market activity. Then when you get toward the end of the year and there’s no food, they loosen up because they have to.
Ong-Dean: Because that helps bring food into the market.
Shirk: It means that it might help people survive. But still, there’s tremendous malnutrition. Very serious malnutrition. And I’ve send the stunting there. Adolescents or 20-year-old people are smaller—they’re stunting. And stunting goes along with cognitive problems too.
(25:00)
Ong-Dean: So, because this is a history project the boys are trying to figure out what the historical foundations of the current condition in North Korea is. They’re trying to tease out what was the role of Soviet-inspired communism, and the philosophy of Juche; and then what is the role of Soviet and Chinese aid in—. And then, different economic philosophies that created the current system. Or was it purely a matter of personality of the leaders?
Shirk: I think it’s more systemic than historical. I’m not a North Korea expert actually. So, the failures of the system, I mean the economic failures, have to do with the shock from the loss of support from the Soviet Union and China. And, the inherent problems of a centrally planned communist economy. And third, the fact that North Korea’s policy behavior has isolated it from the rest of the word. So, now it faces extensive sanctions. So I’d say it’s all those three things.
Connor: Do you think that the global community, and especially the West now that North Korea’s allies in the Eastern bloc have fallen— Does the global community have a responsibility to provide food aid to North Korea? Or are the sanctions that you’ve talked about—are they more important?
Shirk: Now this is really a very difficult question to answer. American policy has constantly been that food aid should be separate from negotiations over nuclear issues. The food aid is a humanitarian matter. But that’s a little disingenuous, because troches of food aid do come when there’s progress in the negotiations. And now the policy is definitely to keep the pressure on North Korea. Because, efforts to negotiate in a positive way through different kinds of inducements—America and most of the international community feels have been unsuccessful. And, the focus is on the nuclear issue. And the nuclear threat. You could argue that we’re making a mistake by fixating on nuclear weapons. You know you could argue that what really matters is whether or not they actually use those nuclear weapons, and what their intentions are, and that we should try to draw them out—. Not use normalization of relations as a carrot that we never award them. It’s really a very interesting set of issues to debate. And then many people would say that, look; yeah we do have a responsibility. We don’t want the people of North Korea to starve. But by the way, there are plenty of other countries in Africa where people are just as bad off. And why not give them aid, rather than the folks in North Korea? (30:00) My own feeling is that food aid should be done as a humanitarian matter in North Korea. But I also support the idea of trying to encourage North Korea to not just take food, but to take trucks or tractors or chemical fertilizer. It will help them grow more of their own food.
Connor: Do you think that the food ever gets to the people? Or is it diverted to military or government officials in the bureaucracy?
Isaac: Yeah, there’s been figures where a large percentage of that food goes to the military and government first, and then has to sort of trickle down to the general population.
Shirk: You know, we have insisted, and the UN food program has insisted, on a lot of monitoring. But, it’s real hard to know. I mean, I don’t believe that none of it gets to ordinary people. I don’t believe that it’s all claimed by them. Because, by the way, the elite in North Korea—the political and military elite…they are fairly comfortable and well-to-do because of all sorts of corrupt earnings. And we haven’t even talked about China and North Korea trade. Which is the other reason that we have market activity there. Because China comes and sells consumer goods and things like that. Chinese traders coming over the border. And North Korea pays for those things in minerals. Because it’s a very rich country in terms of mineral wealth.
Daniel: And is that trade between North Korea and China sort of set up between the two political bodies, or is it just undercover—?
Shirk: Well most of it is non-governmental. Although there are purchases by the government of grain, and oil, and things like that. But in terms of a lot of it is just border trade.
Ong-Dean: And that’s…is that--
Daniel: Tolerated?
Shirk: Yes, it is tolerated. I mean, I met a guy last time I was there—which is fall of 2011—and he had a piano from China. So his kid could have piano lessons. So you know, the elite lives in a much more comfortable lifestyle.
Ong-Dean: But, that kind of trade isn’t available to ordinary people?
Shirk: Well, it’s a question of money.
Connor: You talked about how, through the failed economic reforms that Kim-Jong Il tried, the countries kind of returned to a military-first strategy. It kind of harkens back to the country’s “glory days” in the 50s and 60s and earlier in the country’s founding. Do you think this is the right way to go? Do you think the country should try more economic reforms?
Shirk: Oh absolutely. And also, if—. That’s why I brought North Korean economic officials here. That’s why it’s been—. It’s been kind of a personal goal of mine to try and encourage market reform in North Korea. Because I studied market reform in China, I read a book called the logic of economic reform in China. So the first time I went to North Korea in 1993 I took my book with me. And tried to tell people like a missionary. You know, if you—. It doesn’t have to be political suicide. You could do this and it would work.
Ong-Dean: Do you think the government in North Korea has an incentive to try?
Shirk: Well, it’s really risky. But, on the other hand, what they’re doing now is also very risky. And…it’s just plain evil.
(35:00)
I did not agree with the Bush administration approach, which was actually not that different to the approach today of pretty much freezing relations with North Korea and putting pressure on them. And remember George W. Bush talked about the axis of evil and “I loather Kim-Jong Il”… Anyway. But you can understand why somebody would get that emotional about it because it’s just reprehensible. Have you read the book by Barbara…Demick? Nothing to Envy? Isn’t that an amazing book?
Did you also read Orphan Master’s Son? The novel?
Isaac: No, but I’ve heard recommendations for it.
Shirk: Well it’s a—it won the Pulitzer Prize for fiction last year. And actually it’s by Adam Johnson. Adam Johnson, I think he maybe went on one tour group to North Korea. But he did extensive research. And there’s no way to know how true it is. But it’s a tremendous kind of act of imagination about what it must be like to be in North Korea. I really recommend it. And Adam Johnson is coming to speak at UCSD about his book on January 30th.
So, what I’m saying is you should all read the book. I mean it’s just a great novel. What year are you all?
Daniel: Sophomores. So what’s the title of the book again?
Shirk: Orphan Master’s Son. Oddly—I mean of course it’s disturbing and it’s depressing, but it’s also funny and it’s just a great read.
Connor: Well, back to the economics in North Korea…China had a very committed reformer in Deng Xiaoping. What tools do you think North Korea needs in order to move towards a market economy?
Shirk: Well, especially under Kim-Jong Il—he built up the military as the main power base. The communist party itself is pretty weak. I mean it’s a dictator and an army, it’s a party, and there is a government—the cabinet and the government. But of all those different parts, the military was the strongest. In China, it was the party. So what in China Deng Xiaoping was able to do was to design the reform so the different officials and groups within the party gradually would buy into it and they would see advantages to themselves to engaging in market activity. By letting certain factories, certain firms or localities be experiments to first go and have a lower plan quota and then go and sell to the market and then people would make more money because the prices in the market would be more—. It’s a shortage economy that’s what—. And, you can make more, you can keep more, and before long people are clamoring and groups are clamoring “we want more of this!” So it’s a really successful strategy.
Now you could do the same thing in North Korea…with the military. So, I think it’s possible, but they haven’t done it.
Connor: Do you think there’s someone outside the country who can? I mean do you think if there are--
Shirk: Outside of the country?
Connor: Sure. So, like, your organization is trying to normalize relations with North Korea. Do you think that if the country becomes more respectful of international diplomats or economists…that that could be the direction for North Korea to build their economy?
(40:00)
Shirk: I think the—. I mean again I look at the Chinese case. In the 70s, Deng Xiaoping and other officials started traveling abroad. They saw this huge gap between living standards in China and in other countries, and that was a very important motivator in getting them to introduce market reform.
So, I think we should try and get North Koreans out of North Korea. I mean, just to look and see what it’s like in other places in the world. I am very much in favor of that.
Daniel: Because right now they don’t really know any different.
Shirk: Yeah, and of course, people have no exposure to ideas—. I mean it’s a more closed system than I’d say China was.
Daniel: And talking about that closed system, how much do you think the government there uses that Juche philosophy to sort of instigate the closed system?
Shirk: I think that’s the foundation, the ideological foundation. And a lot in North Korea is because of the competition with South Korea, and the contrast with South Korea. So they claim that they’re the true Koreans; it’s kind of like Juche has a nationalist strain to it. So they say that South Korea has become polluted with all these Western ideas and they’re just the tools of the Americans.
Daniel: Because it’s the North Korean view that they need to be very pure.
Shirk: You need to be a sort of “pure” Korean.
Connor: And the only pure Koreans are North Koreans in their eyes.
Shirk: There’s actually a book written from this angle. Did you read that book…
Connor: I think I know what you’re going to say but go ahead and say it.
Shirk: There’s a book written about these kind of purity—.
Connor: Yeah, the author was a little—. He was the first guy who kind of brought up how Juche is a very nationalistic and also a racial ideology. It’s not Michael Seth it was…it’s on our list; it’s on our reading list.
Daniel: We’ve been talking about the economic sanctions and the effects they’ve had on North Korea. Sort of going back a couple of years, before the 2000s, how do you think that economic sanctions in the past during the time of the Arduous March—during those huge food shortages—. How much do you think that they affected sort of the “common” Korean person?
Ong-Dean: And then also, strengthening that national isolation that’s so characteristic of North Korea today.
Shirk: Well I don’t really know the answer to that specific question about sanctions during that period.
Connor: But do sanctions hurt the people?
Shirk: No I’m not—my knowledge is not that specific. Sanctions—do sanctions hurt people? —I mean, they contribute to the whole backwardness. They can’t repair…they have all these old power plants and things. They can’t get parts to repair it. They have a rusting, decaying industrial plant. Chemical fertilizer is a major need in North Korea.
(45:00)
Ong-Dean: So, you implied that our current policy—the George Bush policy which is not too different from our current policy of isolating North Korea—is not the approach that you would advocate.
Shirk: No, I advocate pressure. But I believe that food aid should be on a separate humanitarian track. I also believe that we need to keep trying to negotiate and to try and get North Koreans out of North Korea…to see things. But I believe that a certain amount of pressure is necessary.
Ong-Dean: Do you think that the current relationship and North Korea doesn’t allow for that open dialogue and negotiation to occur?
Shirk: It’s pretty hard over—. What we’ve basically said is that we need to see action on the nuclear front. That they should unilaterally close things down, invite the inspectors back in, do something that shows they’re serious. Because we don’t want to be suckered again.
Ong-Dean: And you feel like we should move from that position—?
Shirk: I feel that this is a kind of dead end. We’re not going to bring the regime down through sanctions. And, they’re continuing to build up. And it’s a very dangerous regime. We don’t know when they might again make an unprovoked use of force against South Korea. So I guess I believe that we should maybe take a few risks of being frustrated and humiliated again, because you never know when something good might happen. Now, on the other hand, let’s remember, Kim-Jong Un just executed his uncle. I mean, it’s appearing to be a more brutal totalitarian stage of North Korean communism than maybe we’ve ever seen before. You know we would hope that Kim-Jong Un, who has spent time abroad, might take a new approach. But, you know what’s interesting is that these sons—we always have the hope in the sons like Assad in Syria and stuff like that. And, rarely do we see—Gaddafi's son did actually I believe initiated some of the changes in Libya. But typically, we’re disappointed.
Isaac: I read something that said North Koreans consider the tiger father, which is Kim-Jong Il, and then the dog son, which would be Kim-Jong Un, and then they have this execution, which makes them think of him as more of a tiger figure.
Shirk: A strong leader.
Connor: This is just a silly short question, but when you went to North Korea, did you ever get to meet with some families there? I mean you probably didn’t meet with any “normal” or rural families, but outside of your minders, did you get to see any urban families in Pyongyang?
Shirk: Well, I didn’t go to homes. So I haven’t been to anyone’s home.
Connor: They’re obviously pretty secretive about that.
Shirk: You’re supposed to pull your blinds down even. I mean, you know, they didn’t have bicycles in North Korea because of controlling people’s mobility. So, when I first went to North Korea—now there are a few more cars and buses and stuff, but when I first went to North Korea, I would see hundreds of people just walking on these wide boulevards because it wasn’t like China where everybody had bicycles.
Daniel: It’s almost as if they’ve been sent back in time a little bit.
Shirk: Yeah it’s pretty spooky.
(50:00)
Daniel: Do you think that the philosophy of Juche—not sort of its core values, but the way it’s being used by the government in North Korea in sort of controlling people…do you think that the philosophy subverts the social contract?
Shirk: The social contract between ruler and citizen?
Ong-Dean: Yeah, but do you think that that’s even a question you can apply to North Korea?
Daniel: Like even if there is a social contract there?
Ong-Dean: Is there? Do you think that the government and its people would even consider that there’s a social contract between the government and its people.
Shirk: Well, of course the government depicts itself to the people as having their best interests at heart. But, they’re leading their people off a cliff. I mean, it’s—. And meanwhile, the people at the top are living very well.
Ong-Dean: But do you think that the average citizen in North Korea—and I know that you haven’t spoken to many of these, but is your impression that the average North Korean would consider the government as having their best interests in mind?
Shirk: Well I mean if you read Nothing to Envy, you see that people don’t even really let themselves think critical thoughts, especially about the government. That’s what they have to live with.
Ong-Dean: Well, so our question is that this philosophy of self-reliance is something that citizens can hang on to as something that they’re doing—as a kind of patriotism right. So this is our role in the nation; to be self reliant, to weather the storms like famine, and—.
Shirk: Yeah, we’re all together and we stand together and yeah I think people have been educated from a very young age that the risks of critical thinking are huge. Because it’s so repressive. And I think that probably very few people dare to question. And you’re right about the tougher things are, the more dependent people are on the government. So, this is why I think, in the United States, people have exaggerated the ability of the outside world to destabilize and bring down the regime. We’ve underestimated the staying power of this very bad regime. Very bad governments can last for a very long time.
Ong-Dean: And what you’re saying—it’s so funny—is that the harder that we make things on the Korean people, the more reliant they are on their government.
Shirk: Yeah, how are we doing time wise?
Ong-Dean: I think it depends on how much time you have.
Shirk: Yeah, I think let’s do the last question.
Ong-Dean: So, I think that if you just ask about if there’s anything else that Professor Shirk thinks you need to know for your project and if there’s any other information you can give them about people—you’ve already given them some books to read and a talk to go here. If there’s anything else you think they should do—.
Shirk: Yeah, I think they should look at the economic relationship between China and North Korea. And the mythology—are you going to interview Stephen Haggard? (55:00) Well before you go interview him—I gave you his name right? You need to read the book we wrote with Marcus Noland.
Daniel: I think I have it, from the library.
Shirk: It’s the same name as their blog. And that blog is just filled with good information.
Ben: Yeah there’s definitely a lot in there.
Shirk: And they’re also trying to figure out what it means that Kim-Jong Un killed his uncle. Does it mean that they’re really weak now, or…? It just tells you how opaque and how hard it is to form judgments because we have so little information and we don’t have—I mean we have theories, but it’s really hard to know which theories to apply.
Daniel: And then just a last thing, do you have any other people you think would be good for us to interview?
Shirk: I don’t think in town there are other people—I mean Stephen Haggard is the person who is most knowledgeable about North Korea here for sure. I’m very interested in North Korea, but it’s not really my scholarly area.
(Interview ends)